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Whose Knowledge? Whose Influence? 
Changing Dynamics of China’s 
Development Cooperation Policy and 
Practice*
Jing Gu,1 Xiaoyun Li2 and Chuanhong Zhang3
Abstract This article aims to investigate the recent evolution of 
China’s development policy and practice. More precisely, how 
do China’s policymakers and practitioners understand and 
debate China’s role in international development, specifically in 
the context of the global Covid-19 pandemic? China’s growing 
development activities overseas, particularly in the African 
continent, have spurred intense debate over its role as a rising 
power in international development. China is viewed in the 
West both as a threat and as a valuable potential partner in 
development cooperation. However, differences between Western 
and Chinese conceptions of development have complicated 
cooperation and understanding of China’s development policy. 
Further understanding of these differences is needed, in order 
to evaluate their implications for low-income countries, and for 
potential trilateral cooperation.
Keywords development cooperation, knowledge, governance, 
practice, development policy, China.
1 Introduction
China’s growing role as a provider of development assistance, 
and the broader impact of its economic engagement overseas, 
has been the subject of considerable interest both within and 
outside China in recent years. There has been intense debate 
about the nature of Chinese foreign aid, especially in Africa 
and Asia. In particular, the question of what role China plays 
in global development has fascinated the world. There is a 
rich body of literature, ranging from studies on China’s aid 
modalities to research specifically focusing on aid data, and 
case studies on different projects or sectors. Conclusions and 
opinions appear divided: there are positive analyses that echo 
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the ‘win–win’ perspective of stakeholders from both China and 
partner countries through to scepticism from those who argue 
that China’s primary interest is in accessing raw materials and 
exporting its labour and goods.
However, communication and collaboration between Chinese 
and international policy researchers and practitioners have been 
limited, creating a knowledge gap and understandable deficit 
between different stakeholders. Similar to ‘traditional’ Western 
donors trying to re-establish global development aid architecture, 
China is also pursuing a bigger international role for itself through 
new multilateral platforms, including the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), and the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
In this context, this IDS Bulletin brings together studies of the 
primary institutions and policies that guide China’s activities 
in development cooperation. It also explores a range of 
cross-cutting topics including: the new Asian development 
finance and the potential impact of China on development 
thinking and policies; and China’s development practice and the 
effectiveness of South–South cooperation (SSC) and triangular 
cooperation. In an era where the ‘traditional’ aid discourses 
and the practices of new ‘emerging powers’ in development 
cooperation are simultaneously reacting and evolving – and 
given China’s growing prominence as a source of development 
finance and as an institutional player, and the potential that it 
offers for poverty reduction and growth in low-income countries – 
there is a real need for greater mutual understanding to promote 
effective cooperation and healthy competition in development 
cooperation.
2 Evolution of China’s development cooperation
Aid, or development assistance in the traditional sense, forms 
a small element of China’s development cooperation, which 
entails a much broader model of economic engagement that 
includes significant trade, loans, and capital investments. 
Official definitions and statistics around China’s foreign aid 
remain vague and are often classified, and the practical and 
experimental nature of Chinese development assistance means 
there is little articulation of a model for China’s development 
cooperation. The 2021 White Paper (SCIO 2021) lists technical 
cooperation, debt relief, and projects as major forms of aid. 
Of these foreign assistance projects, a majority is spent on 
economic infrastructure, followed by industry, energy and resource 
development, and agriculture. Grants, concessionary loans, and 
assistance for joint ventures are the primary forms of financing, 
which are used in concert with its investment and trade policies in 
order to leverage greater investment from the commercial sector.
China is often categorised as an emerging economy, but China 
is not an emerging donor. China started to provide development 
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assistance to other developing countries in the 1950s. Over the 
past 70 years, the concepts and policies of China’s development 
cooperation have been constantly adjusted, showing multi-level, 
multi-stakeholder, and multifaceted characteristics. China’s 
development cooperation policy has evolved in three main 
stages, resonating with China’s domestic policy transformation. 
Each stage features its own priorities and shows different 
characteristics.
The first stage of China’s foreign aid is more ideologically focused. 
In the early days of the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China, revolution was the main theme of the world at that 
time. The Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the breakdown of 
Sino-Soviet relations put China in an isolated situation. As a 
newly established regime, gaining the recognition of its national 
sovereignty by the international community was the top priority. 
Also, as a large country, to restore its status as a permanent 
member of the United Nations was the most urgent task. To win 
support from developing countries was a feasible approach 
to achieving these objectives. Therefore, during this period, 
political objectives dominated China’s international development 
cooperation policies. Most resources from China went to 
supporting the proletarian revolution and anti-imperialism of 
developing countries. Foreign aid became the main source for 
China to fulfil its international responsibilities and to build its 
national prestige.
China’s international cooperation during this period was mainly 
in the form of assistance in material, cash, and complete projects 
(similar to Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects) and was 
designed within the centrally planned economic system. From 
1953 to 1963, China’s foreign aid accounted for 1 per cent of its 
fiscal expenses. It has been increasing continuously since 1963, 
and by the fourth Five-Year Plan period (1968–73), China’s foreign 
assistance had reached 6.3 per cent of its fiscal expense and 
2.06 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP), while at the 
same time, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) members only contributed 0.3 per cent of their gross 
national income (GNI). During this period, three quarters of China’s 
foreign aid went to North Korea, Vietnam, Albania, Laos, and 
Cambodia. During 1959–75, China provided more than US$838m 
to just one country, Albania, which is 8.9 times more than the West 
provided to this country (Backer 1982).
The ‘Eight Principles’ put forward by Premier Zhou Enlai during 
his talks with the Ghanaian president, Kwame Nkrumah, in 
19644 became the guiding principles of China’s international 
cooperation, and the concept of equality, cooperation, and 
mutual benefit (Li 2007) was strongly resonated by developing 
countries. Although mutual benefit was mentioned as one 
of the key principles, political solidarity carried more weight 
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in China’s development cooperation in practice during this 
period, which also brought benefit to the partner countries. The 
Tanzania–Zambia Railway built by China in the 1970s not only 
played a significant role for Southern African countries gaining 
independence, but was also a first try for China to promote its 
own development experiences (Hall and Peyman 1976). It certainly 
won the hearts and minds of African people, which made the 
huge economic sacrifice of China worthwhile. China successfully 
resumed its status as one of the five permanent members of the 
UN Security Council in 1971 with the support of African countries. 
But cooperation forged with aid from China for other countries 
did not turn out to be so fruitful. For example, China’s relationship 
with Vietnam broke down in the late 1970s, even though China 
had provided it with huge support.
The second stage starts from the reform and opening policy 
in 1978. China’s then top leader Deng Xiaoping made the 
‘scientific judgement’ that ‘peace and development’ would 
be the main theme of this new era. In a series of speeches 
on international cooperation, Deng Xiaoping stressed that 
China’s international cooperation cause needed to ‘act 
according to its capacity’, and added the principle of ‘seeking 
truth from facts’ to the principles of international cooperation. 
In December 1982, the then Premier Zhao Ziyang proposed new 
four principles of China’s foreign aid when he visited Africa, 
i.e. ‘equality and mutual benefit, emphasis on practical results, 
diverse forms, and common development’ (Jinghuashibao 2014). 
China still adhered to the spirit of proletarian internationalism, 
but at the operational level, foreign aid should also serve China’s 
reform and opening policy.
The principles of equality and mutual benefit became guiding 
principles of China’s foreign aid. It has also become the 
guiding principle for promoting economic and trade relations with 
other countries. The definition of development cooperation has 
gone beyond foreign aid as trade and investment have become 
indispensable components for development. Under the guidance 
of the core principles, China’s foreign aid policy has undergone 
several reforms, gradually shifting from the ideologically focused 
to promoting mutually beneficial cooperation between China 
and partner countries. This new concept of equal partnership has 
been widely accepted by foreign countries as it is seen as being 
able to diminish the inherent inequality in the ‘donor–recipient 
paradigm’ (Moyo 2009).
There are two salient features of China’s development cooperation 
during this period. First, the volume of China’s foreign aid has 
increased significantly since the mid-1990s after decreasing in 
the 1980s. According to the first White Paper on China’s foreign 
aid (SCIO 2011), during 2004–09, the annual growth rate of 
China’s foreign aid reached 29.4 per cent, surpassing that of most 
developed countries during the same period. Second, economic 
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development for both China and partner countries was prioritised 
over other factors. The complete projects (BOT) supported by 
concessional loans have become the most important form of 
China’s development cooperation. According to the 2014 White 
Paper on China’s foreign aid, in just three years (2010–12), China 
built 580 complete projects in 80 countries, concentrating on 
infrastructure and agriculture sectors (SCIO 2014).
In terms of the administrative system, in the context of the 
institutional reform of the ‘separation of government functions 
from enterprise management’ in 1995, China began to expand 
the scale of aid funds in the form of government concessional 
and preferential loans (Li 2007). The introduction of the market 
mechanism changed direct state control over the economy, and 
enterprises became the subjects of market. Different government 
departments participating in China’s development cooperation 
could mobilise professional resources to implement foreign aid 
projects.
The administration of development cooperation became quite 
fragmented as the original administrative system gradually 
disintegrated, and the functions of the government began to 
change. With the addition of market factors, some aid projects 
gained economic benefit for the Chinese companies. The 
combination of aid with investment and trade contributed to 
the transnational flow of capital and human resources between 
China and other developing countries. Marketisation reforms such 
as ‘equity participation’ and ‘debt-to-equity swap’, revived some 
old projects that had not run well. Chinese and local enterprises 
were encouraged to implement China’s international cooperation 
projects in the form of joint ventures. Through the injection of 
market funds, more resources were mobilised.
The third stage began in 2013, when China’s development 
cooperation entered into a new era. The phenomenal growth 
of China’s economy not only changed China’s status in the 
world, but also increased the global expectation that China 
should shoulder more international responsibility. In 2013, 
when President Xi Jinping visited Africa, he proposed the new 
development cooperation principle between China and African 
countries, the ideology on ‘righteousness over benefit’ (‘弘义让利 
honghongyirangli’ in Chinese). Specifically, it means that China 
will conduct development cooperation with Africa based more on 
‘righteousness rather than mere benefit’. China needs to prioritise 
‘righteousness’ over ‘benefit’, to ‘give more and take less’, or ‘give 
first, take later’. In some cases, only giving, no taking (Xi 2013).
To refute the accusation of ‘neo-colonialism’ and ‘debt trap’ on 
China–Africa cooperation, President Xi reiterated the ‘five no’ 
policies at the Beijing Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 
summit in 2018: do not interfere with African countries in exploring 
development paths that suit their national conditions, do not 
6 | Gu et al. Whose Knowledge? Whose Influence? Changing Dynamics of China’s Development Cooperation Policy and Practice
IDS Bulletin Vol. 52 No. 2 November 2021 ‘China and International Development: Knowledge, Governance, and Practice’
interfere in the internal affairs of Africa, do not impose China’s will 
on partner countries, do not attach any political conditions to 
aid to Africa, and do not seek private political gains in investment 
and financing in Africa. These policies adhere to the five principles 
of peaceful coexistence in China’s foreign policies formulated 
in 1954, which fundamentally convinced African countries that 
China’s main objective was to help develop their economy and 
eradicate poverty.
During this period, more development aid went to the least 
developed countries (LDCs). President Xi promised to provide 
US$12bn to LDCs by 2030 at the UN Sustainable Development 
Summit in 2015. Rather than emphasising the political or economic 
gains, China’s development cooperation has expanded into 
broader areas such as environmental sustainability, peace and 
security, and people-to-people exchange (Gu and Kitano 2018). 
The volume and geographical coverage of China’s foreign aid 
has increased steadily. From 2013 to 2018, China provided more 
than RMB27bn to other developing countries. Since the global 
outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, China has provided different 
types of health aid to 53 African countries and the African Union, 
including personal protective equipment, respirators, vaccines, 
and medical teams (SCIO 2021).
At the same time, China has become an active supporter of 
multilateralism (Carty and Gu 2021). China responded actively 
to the call of the G20 on the Debt Service Suspension Initiative 
(DSSI). China has reached consensus or signed contracts on DSSI 
with 19 African countries and cancelled the interest-free loans of 
15 African countries that needed to be paid by the end of 2020. 
The BRI has become the most important platform for China’s 
development cooperation and new multilateral banks such as the 
AIIB and the NDB have also become important facilitators of new 
development cooperation (Gu and Carey 2019). All these indicate 
that while adhering to the principle of mutual benefit, altruistic 
elements are becoming more important in China’s development 
cooperation, showing China’s willingness to shoulder more global 
responsibility to promote sustainable development.
From the above analysis, we can see clearly that China’s 
development policy reform has been closely related to its 
domestic development strategy. ‘Mutual benefit’ is a core 
principle in China’s aid and foreign policy, through which it 
helps build up the partner country’s capacity for independent 
‘self-development’. From the practice perspective, China’s 
development cooperation has transformed from concentration 
on a few countries with clear political goals to the demand-
driven nature of partner countries. In most recent years, focusing 
on sustainable as well as inclusive development has become the 
new direction for China’s development cooperation. By doing this, 
China’s development cooperation has been moving to ‘building a 
global community for a shared future’ (Xi 2015).
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3 China’s new approaches to international development
Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) in November 2012, the central committee of the 
CPC identified the overall goal of deepening comprehensive 
reform of China and to promote the modernisation of the 
national governance system and governance capacity. In March 
2018, China established the China International Development 
Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), an independent ministerial-level 
agency, to be responsible for policymaking relating to China’s 
foreign aid while the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China (MOFCOM) would still be responsible for 
the implementation of development cooperation projects. 
The fragmentation of the institutional setting has changed 
to some extent. The 2021 White Paper officially extended 
the concept of foreign aid to development cooperation, 
incorporating cooperation under the BRI with China’s foreign 
aid, and re-emphasising that China will conduct development 
cooperation under the framework of SSC.
While current Western development aid focuses strongly on 
notions of poverty reduction, social welfare, and political and 
institutional reform, Chinese development cooperation forms a 
much broader remit that emphasises economic relationships. 
China’s approach to international development has been 
shaped by two important policy frameworks on development, 
the first formulated through the Chinese state, the second 
through the CPC. Firstly, the 14th Five-Year Plan, adopted by the 
Fourth Session of the 13th National People’s Congress in March 
2021,5 defined a concept of high-quality growth with innovative, 
coordinated, and green development. These central principles 
underpinning China’s approach to implementation coalesce 
with those of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(2030 Agenda).
In dominant Chinese perspectives, sustainable development 
emphasises the need for a holistic, integrated approach to 
policy and practice (Gu et al. 2016; Gu, Corbett and Leach 2019). 
Broadly, it embraces the idea of ecological civilisation as the final 
goal of change within a given society, involving a synthesis of 
economic, educational, political, agricultural, and other societal 
reforms towards sustainability (Zhu 2016). Peaceful development, 
win–win cooperation, integration and coordination, inclusiveness 
and openness, sovereignty and voluntary action, as well as 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, should be followed in 
building a new type of international relations featuring win–win 
cooperation, establishing all-round partnership, and achieving 
economic, social, and environmental development in a balanced 
manner (UN 2016: 2).
In 2021, the Chinese government published China’s second 
Position Paper on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (MFA 2021). This sets out the principles, 
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priorities, and policies and sought to explain the progress made 
in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. The paper set out a 
number of specific elements to be pursued as priority aims:
 l Promote high-quality development. As China enters a new 
development stage, the goal is to achieve sustained and 
healthy economic development through improved quality and 
efficiency, guided by the new development philosophy.
 l Accelerate innovation and digitalisation. Promote the deep 
integration of digital technology with the real economy, use 
digital technology to promote innovation in public services, and 
improve the efficiency of government.
 l Improve people’s wellbeing and all-round development. China 
will develop a high-quality education system, advance the 
Healthy China Programme across the board, and implement 
the national strategy for population ageing.
 l Boost green development. China will accelerate the green 
transformation, and increase the efficiency of energy, water, 
land, and mineral resources. As an active response to climate 
change, China will strive to peak carbon emissions before 2030 
and realise carbon neutrality before 2060.
China further emphasises the need for global partnership and 
collective action in implementing the 2030 Agenda, stating that 
China will work with the global community to provide sound 
support in five principal ways: 
 l Upholding multilateralism for equity and justice;
 l Fostering an open world economy for a sound international 
development environment;
 l Deepening South–South cooperation and global partnerships;
 l Supporting international post-Covid-19 recovery;
 l Advancing global green and low-carbon transformation and 
enhancing the global climate response.
The second key policy framework is China’s ‘new development 
philosophy’ initiated and explained by Xi Jinping in his Secretary-
General’s Report to the CPC Congress in October 2017. China’s 
development of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics for a 
new era’ under President Xi has at its core a ‘people-centered 
philosophy of development’ (Xi 2017: 1, 16); a philosophy reflecting 
and reinforcing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 
2030 Agenda commitment to ‘leave no one behind’. 
China’s business sector has become increasingly involved in 
development projects, fuelled in part by its ‘going global’ strategy 
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initiated in 2000. This policy used state incentives, including 
preferential trade regulations, low-interest loans, and Export–
Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank) support, in order to 
promote the outward investment and global expansion of China’s 
leading firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). China’s SOEs 
have been involved in both labour-intensive manufacturing and 
infrastructure construction in developing countries, often through 
joint ventures with local private enterprises and SOEs, and have 
become highly influential in developing countries. However, 
beyond multinational SOEs, a growing wave of Chinese private 
firms and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are moving 
abroad. These SMEs are driven by growing domestic competition 
to seek new market opportunities overseas, but they do so with 
little coordination and direction from the state, and are often 
underprepared when operating in foreign and new environments.
The increasing role of market-driven businesses and SOEs in 
Chinese aid project implementation indicates an important 
transition away from state-dominated foreign aid. The growing 
diversity and multitude of Chinese firms now operating in Africa 
presents a challenge for state coordination, and in mediating 
China’s sometimes controversial public image abroad. Though 
incentivised by the state, business actors also act autonomously 
from state directives, and this must be recognised when liaising 
with Chinese business or state actors. Conflicts between state 
aims and business goals may be an emerging tension as China’s 
development activities evolve, leading to a potential gap 
between policy and practice.
China’s approach to aid significantly differs from that of Western 
donors and is still evolving, and awareness of differences in 
ideologies behind aid and development remains key to future 
successful aid cooperation. China does not wish to be regarded 
as a donor; its conceptions of its development cooperation and 
rejection of a donor identity must be respected when building 
engagement and cooperation bilaterally or in global forums. 
Though non-interference is a central principle of China’s foreign 
aid policies, its growing involvement and investments in high-risk 
parts of the world mean that this may be increasingly difficult 
to sustain. Increased political engagement and investment in 
security may be a necessary spillover in China’s engagement in 
fragile states.
The institutional context of China’s development cooperation 
is complex, and Western donors and external partners must 
take these differentiated political roles into consideration in 
order to effectively pursue trilateral development cooperation. 
The Chinese state and CIDCA in particular still has very limited 
capacity in coordinating between the multitude of actors 
operating in this environment. As China’s development assistance 
commitments grow, the institutional capacity and responsibility of 
this nascent agency will also need to be developed. Prospects for 
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trilateral cooperation remain viable, particularly in forums like the 
G20, which has adopted shared growth and development as a 
part of its core agenda. As discussed in Section 2, China has also 
taken steps towards avenues for cooperation, and the creation 
of CIDCA shows it is willing to learn from, and be amenable to 
cooperation with, traditional donors. However, recipient countries 
must be central in leading and participating in discussions 
around trilateral cooperation with Western countries and China.
4 Contributions to this issue
The articles in this IDS Bulletin provide a rich diversity of further 
contributions to this important and ongoing debate. They supply 
much needed detail of what is happening in practice on the 
ground, adding to existing evidence and further illuminating 
the issues being debated internationally about China’s role 
in international development. Though wide-ranging in their 
coverage, these articles are aligned around the central theme 
of this IDS Bulletin; namely, China’s development policy and 
practices. Taking this central theme, the respective articles 
focus on the question of what China contributes to international 
development and the implications for global development 
cooperation.
The articles focus, thematically, on just what this overarching 
ambition means in practice. In the first, Jiantuo Yu and Evan 
Due (this IDS Bulletin) look at some of the characteristics of 
China’s foreign aid system and its development over the years. 
The article discusses China’s foreign aid based on China’s 
own development experiences and its view of SSC. As China’s 
international aid continues to grow and become more prominent, 
particularly in the context of the BRI, the article calls for a deeper 
understanding of China’s aid institutions and the need for greater 
cooperation and capacity building.
In the second article, by Karin Costa Vazquez and Yu Zheng 
(this IDS Bulletin), the analysis centres on the recent challenges 
posed for multilateralism, and the emergence of a sustainable 
development regime which has pushed countries to engage 
in more flexible, fluid, and issue-based development finance 
initiatives and institutions. These changes have had a profound 
impact on how China conceives and delivers its development 
finance. The authors argue that it is critical to understand 
that China’s development finance has been increasingly 
market oriented, concerned with financial and environmental 
sustainability, and delivered through hybrid bilateral-multilateral 
channels, particularly since the launch of the BRI.
Shaped by the changes that China experienced at both 
international and domestic levels, particularly the consolidation 
of its aid governance structure, these new features signal the 
rise of a ‘new Asian development finance’. This is refocusing the 
global debate to the importance of combining aid, trade, and 
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investment under financially and environmentally sustainable 
frameworks, and channelling development finance through 
multilateral channels to catalyse structural transformation.
Against the background and context provided by the present 
introduction and the two initial articles, the following six articles 
provide theme-focused studies. Jiajun Xu and Richard Carey 
(this IDS Bulletin) examine the impacts, actual and potential, of 
China’s development experiences upon development thinking 
and policies elsewhere. They argue that the New Structural 
Economics provides a framework in which three agendas stand 
out – structural transformation as a policy priority; the return of 
industrial policy; and the use of Special Economic Zones. They 
integrate related drivers of growth in China – rapid urbanisation 
pulling in massive rural migration in an economic transformation 
process; the financing of provincial and city governments by 
improvised local government financing vehicles based on rising 
urban land values; and competition and accountability processes 
in China’s subnational governance system. While China’s 
experiences cannot be directly replicated elsewhere, they argue 
that lessons on why and how to achieve structural transformation 
are relevant for other developing countries, especially in fast 
urbanising and integrating Africa.
In their article on China’s non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
partnerships in a new era of development cooperation, Anthea 
Mulakala, Robin Bush, and Hongbo Ji (this IDS Bulletin), argue 
that NGO engagement in international development activities 
would improve their effectiveness. However, challenges exist that 
constrain optimal engagement, especially access to funding and 
a weak enabling environment and policy framework. This article 
addresses these challenges, drawing from the literature on ‘going 
out’ among Chinese NGOs and social organisations, along with 
interviews with key players in the Chinese NGO ecosystem. The 
authors recommend, among other things, that the government 
clarify and improve its policy framework for NGOs/social 
organisations in support of China’s international development 
collaboration, especially regarding funding flows, personnel 
regulations, and material and capital outflows.
In their article, Chuanhong Zhang, Xiaoyun Li, and Dawit Alemu 
(this IDS Bulletin) examine the effectiveness of SSC through a 
study of China’s agricultural aid projects in Africa. They argue 
that ‘ownership’ matters for the effectiveness of SSC. Their 
analysis centres on the representation of ownership in SSC and 
how it affects the process and impact of SSC projects using 
case studies of three uniformly designed Chinese agricultural 
aid projects in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ethiopia. Based on 
long-term participatory observation and in-depth interviews, 
they argue that ownership in SSC is represented differently from 
project design to implementation. Divergence and ambiguity 
exist among different stakeholders in the operation of ownership. 
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Co-ownership of the two partners at the local level contributes 
to the effectiveness of SSC projects, while de-ownership and 
forced ownership have a negative impact on the survival and 
sustainable development of an SSC project. It is concomitant 
upon partners to make strong efforts, including in consultation 
and community engagement, to ensure that the challenges are 
overcome and opportunities are realised in practice.
The next article, by Xiuli Xu, Lídia Cabral, and Yingdan Cao (this 
IDS Bulletin), explores the formation of China’s modern agricultural 
science capability and its approach towards learning. The authors 
argue that while China was previously regarded and treated as 
a recipient of international scientific expertise, it is now a more 
equal partner and contributor, with capacity to provide funds, 
support exchange programmes for scientists, and collaborate 
in building laboratories and joint research programmes. Some 
of these are now extending beyond the CGIAR (formerly the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research) system 
and creating new Southern platforms for scientific collaboration 
and knowledge production. By offering an illustration of China’s 
‘selective learning’ approach, emphasising self-reliance and 
pragmatism in its engagement with the CGIAR, this article 
feeds into broader debates on how China contributes to global 
development knowledge and learning.
The article on Chinese foundations in international cooperation 
by Lindan Tan and Huib Huyse (this IDS Bulletin) argues that 
China’s international cooperation strategies are gradually 
changing due to evolving views about the limits of its 
internationalisation approach, which has traditionally mainly 
focused on building governmental and business relationships. 
Intensified interactions with developing countries in the context 
of the BRI are perceived to benefit from an increased role for 
its domestic NGOs. This article explores China’s initial steps 
in enabling its quickly evolving domestic NGO landscape 
to internationalise by looking at this development from an 
organisational capacity perspective. By assessing five key 
organisational characteristics of 36 Chinese foundations that 
engage in international cooperation over the period 2014–19, 
the authors find that the average organisational capacity for 
international cooperation is still limited but is showing gradual 
improvement. While they all comply with government regulations 
in governance and several foundations have large budgets and 
capacity for their domestic operations, the authors suggest that 
only a few currently mobilise substantial human and financial 
resources for their international activities.
The final article, by Sebastian Prantz and Xiaomin Zhang (this 
IDS Bulletin), broadens the perspective once again to consider 
the triangular aid cooperation conducted by China and Germany 
in Laos, Ethiopia, and Zambia. The article critically reviews the rise 
of the triangular cooperation modality to promote development 
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effectiveness in recent years. The authors argue that the aim of 
triangular cooperation is to utilise the comparative advantages 
of development cooperation approaches by a pivotal partner 
(usually an emerging donor) and a facilitating partner (usually a 
traditional donor) to effectively generate development impacts 
together with a beneficiary in its country, while at the same time 
strengthening the partnership of all actors involved. Recent 
years have seen an uptake in Chinese institutions actively 
engaging with international development partners in triangular 
cooperation. China and Germany have jointly founded the 
Sino-German Center for Sustainable Development to conduct 
triangular cooperation projects. This article explores the fields, 
frameworks, mechanism, and effects of triangular cooperation 
projects launched by China and Germany by examining case 
studies of projects initiated in Laos, Ethiopia, and Zambia.
5 Development cooperation in the pandemic era – China and 
the West
Global development is at a turning point. The common global 
challenges of climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic 
threaten all countries and demand unprecedented global 
cooperation. We need to recognise the differences and 
competition between regions and countries while still promoting 
development cooperation. Global challenges require global 
responses and local solutions. In an international environment of 
increasing tension and rivalry in the struggle for natural resources, 
in an ideological conflict over models of governance – and 
over increasing security anxieties generated by possibilities of 
technological surveillance – the need for policy-oriented research 
networking across borders could not be more essential.
The past two years have highlighted the ways in which prospects 
for global development cooperation have continued to be 
shaped by geopolitics, global health, and the global economy. 
The years 2020 and 2021 saw the unexpected global health crisis 
caused by Covid-19 and the global economic downturn. Further, 
China’s position in global trade and climate change negotiations 
emphasised the changing balance of economic and political 
power in the global economy.
China’s impressive economic growth and increasing development 
activities overseas, particularly in the African continent, have 
spurred intense debate over its role as a rising power in international 
development (Gu and Carey 2019; Renwick and Gu 2020). China’s 
global engagement with the developing world is changing 
rapidly and fundamentally. These fast-growing activities present 
both internal and external challenges for China and the world. 
How these challenges and knowledge gaps are addressed will 
not only determine China’s internal governance on development 
issues, but also its external activities and behaviours that are now 
having a profound global impact.
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China is viewed in some Western perspectives as both a threat 
and as a valuable potential partner in development cooperation. 
However, differences between Western and Chinese conceptions 
of governance and development have complicated cooperation 
and understanding of China’s development policy and practices. 
The Covid-19 global health crisis became an invisible contesting 
ground beyond the immediate challenges being played out in 
response to the unfolding pandemic. On the one hand, China 
hoped to present the best possible image of its country to 
the world as it rolled out its most intensive and largest-scale 
emergency humanitarian assistance mission in recent years 
(Kurtzer and Gonzales 2020). On the other hand, the West hoped 
the pressure from the international development community 
could help to change China, recasting its image to align more 
closely to Western norms of governance and democracy. Further 
and deeper knowledge of these differences is needed, in order 
to evaluate their implications for low-income countries, and for 
potential trilateral cooperation.
6 How can the West cooperate while competing with China?
It has become customary, on the Western side, to categorise 
West–China relations as based on three types of relationship: 
partnership – where specific interests can be balanced and  
win–win is possible; competition – where market forces are 
accepted as valid determiners of outcomes; and strategic rivalry 
– where each side tries to outdo the other, displacing the other 
in the international sphere with its own model of governance, and 
bringing with that triumph a zero-sum relationship in a broad 
range of areas. Where does a global striving for sustainable 
development find its place in the face of these three types of 
relationship?
The answer is to leave behind all of these conventional ways of 
thinking and to recognise that development concerns overcome 
group/national egotism – through a common dedication to 
the ideal of furthering the welfare of those nations and regions 
which are in danger of being left behind in global development. 
Even partnership to balance interests is not enough. It is not 
a matter of individual aid providers gaining equal benefits for 
their interests by helping needy countries to progress. Instead, 
it is by focusing themselves jointly on the third parties they wish 
to assist, in dialogue with the latter, that there is a real hope of 
fruitful outcomes, where all grow and are enhanced from enjoying 
progress together, in a triangular relationship: the West, China, 
and the global South.
The history of China shows that real change comes from within, 
not without. China’s developmental success has been driven by 
the country’s own changing system, not from without, though 
the country has drawn on external knowledge and development 
assistance. China’s remarkable development trajectory has been 
acknowledged by the international community. As the largest 
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SSC provider and the second largest economy in the world, 
China’s new initiatives and practices in development cooperation, 
with distinct features from that provided by traditional donors, 
will reshape the landscape of global development, leading to 
the generation of new development knowledge and global 
development cooperation governance architecture.
With the AIIB and NDB being the first major multilateral 
development banks created once climate change had 
finally been acknowledged as a major issue to be addressed 
internationally, China has an opportunity to pioneer the design 
and funding of positive strategies that support sustainable and 
inclusive development; for example, around renewable energy 
or labour-intensive technologies/sectors. China’s role grew 
from one that was just focused on development financing to 
becoming a knowledge power that produced theory and policy 
applications for global development (Gu 2015). Increasingly, 
scholars are focused on the implications of what its ‘peaceful rise’ 
means for the international competitiveness of other countries’ 
manufactures; for financial and exchange rate stability; for 
military security; for global public goods; and for international 
development knowledge mobilisation and cooperation.
There is a pressing need for countries to build up the capacity to 
better understand and better participate in global and national 
development. Initiatives that help to foster mutual learning and 
long-term relationships are vital. In a changed, and still rapidly 
changing, global landscape there is much debate on the future of 
development cooperation. Further dialogue is needed to explore 
new approaches to international development cooperation and 
healthy competition over the coming decades. How to build an 
essential foundation and rule-based international order to share 
responsibilities and build mutual trust and understanding will be 
the critical challenge in a post-pandemic era.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin was produced as part of the UK Anchor 
Institution for the China International Development 
Research Network, funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth 
& Development Office (FCDO). The opinions expressed are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or 
policies of IDS or the UK government.
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